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TAKING TENSE SERIOUSLY IN  
DIFFERENTIATING PAST AND FUTURE:  
A RESPONSE TO WES MORRISTON
William Lane Craig
Wes Morriston argues that even if we take an endless series of events to be 
merely potentially, rather than actually, infinite, still no distinction between 
a beginningless and an endless series of events has been established which 
is relevant to arguments against the metaphysical possibility of an actually 
infinite number of things: if a beginningless series is impossible, so is an end-
less series. The success of Morriston’s argument, however, comes to depend 
on rejecting the characterization of an endless series of events as a potential 
infinite. It turns out that according to his own analysis it is vitally relevant 
whether the series of events is potentially, as opposed to actually, infinite. 
If it is reasonable to maintain that an endless series of events is potentially 
infinite while a beginningless series is actually infinite, then a relevant dis-
tinction has been established for any person who thinks that an actual infinite 
cannot exist.
I
According to Wes Morriston, the heart of his paper1 is concerned with 
two claims:
(i) that an endless series of events is a merely potential infinite
and
(ii) that this establishes a relevant distinction between the beginning-
less past (which is supposedly impossible) and an endless future 
(which is clearly possible).
He tells us that “I will argue that no relevant distinction has been es-
tablished.” Morriston’s statement makes it evident that his critique will 
be directed at the second claim above. To be successful, such a critique 
must grant (i), at least for the sake of argument. Morriston needs to show 
that even if an endless series of events is merely potentially, rather than 
actually, infinite, then no relevant distinction between the two series has 
been established.
1Wes Morriston, “Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite,” Faith and 
Philosophy 27.4: 439–450.
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A careful reading of Morriston’s paper reveals, however, that he fails 
in his objective, for midway through his paper, beginning in the section 
entitled “A Merely Potential Infinite?,” Morriston shifts to attacking, rather 
than conceding, (i). The success of his argument thus comes to depend on 
rejecting (i)’s characterization of an endless series of events as a potential 
infinite. It turns out that according to his own analysis it is vitally relevant 
whether the series of events is potentially, as opposed to actually, infinite. 
If it is reasonable to maintain that an endless series of events is potentially 
infinite while a beginningless series is actually infinite, then a relevant 
distinction has been established for any person who thinks that an actual 
infinite cannot exist.
Morriston’s attack on the potential infinitude of an endless series of 
events is thus of much broader interest than the concerns of natural theol-
ogy, for virtually all philosophers who espouse a tensed, or A-theory of 
time, hold that the series of successively ordered, isochronous events later 
than some denominated event is potentially infinite.
II
Morriston’s argument prior to the crucial above mentioned shift is fatally 
ambiguous.2 There are two ways in which a temporal series of isochro-
nous events which has a beginning might be endless: (i) it might be ac-
tually infinite, that is to say, composed of an actually infinite number of 
events; (ii) it might be potentially infinite, that is to say, composed of a 
finite but ever increasing number of events with infinity as a limit. The 
second answer entails an A-theory of time according to which temporal 
becoming is an objective feature of reality, whereas the first answer is nat-
urally associated with a B-theory according to which all events in time are 
on an ontological par.
So with respect to Morriston’s illustration of two angels who begin to 
praise God forever, an A-theorist will concur whole-heartedly with his 
statement, “If you ask, ‘How many distinct praises will be said?’ the only 
sensible answer is, infinitely many”—that is to say, potentially infinitely 
many. If this answer is allowed the A-theorist, then Morriston’s allegedly 
parallel arguments collapse. God could have made room for potentially 
infinitely many more praises by a third angel, in which case potentially 
infinitely many praises are “added,” and the praises of all three angels 
will be sung in the same potentially infinite amount of time. No absurdity 
there, for the number of praises said by the angels will always be finite, 
even though increasing toward infinity as a limit. Or again, if God de-
termined that the angels stop after the fourth praise or if one angel were 
2Although I am not entirely happy with Morriston’s reconstruction of my argument for 
finitism, I let that pass. Rather than speaking of alternative possible worlds, I should speak 
in terms of counterfactual conditionals. If every other guest in Hilbert’s Hotel were to check 
out, how many would be left? The thought experiment does not depend on the truth of the 
antecedent. I think that there are non-trivially true counterfactuals with impossible anteced-
ents, e.g., “If God did not exist, the universe would not exist.”
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silenced, potentially infinitely many praises would be prevented, but in 
one case only four praises will be said while in the other potentially in-
finitely many will be said. Again, there is no absurdity, since the infinity 
is merely potential. Nothing parallel can be said of a beginningless series 
of events, for given the asymmetry of temporal becoming the past cannot 
be potentially infinite, for then it would have to be finite but growing in a 
backwards direction.
If such an answer is allowed the A-theorist—as it must be if Morriston 
is to succeed in showing that construing an endless series of events as 
potentially infinite is not relevant to the argument—, then it is clear that 
Morriston’s cases are not at all parallel to a beginningless series of events. 
As becomes even clearer in kalam arguments for the past’s finitude based 
on the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition,3 
the asymmetry of time marks a huge metaphysical difference between 
past and future on an A-theory of time. Perhaps the most telling sentence 
in Morriston’s paper is his puzzled query, “What difference could a mere 
change of tense make?”
III
Realizing that the A-theorist will insist that an endless series of events is 
properly a potential rather than an actual infinite, Morriston in the second 
part of his paper turns, contrary to his stated purpose, to challenging the 
claim that an endless series of events is merely potentially infinite. He 
asks, “Is it clear that the endless series of future praises envisaged above is 
a potential, rather than an actual, infinite?” “Given the reality of temporal 
becoming, should we say that the endless series of events that I have en-
visaged is a merely potential infinite?”
In order to justify a negative answer to those questions, Morriston mis-
construes the A-theorist’s view in a perverse but interesting way. When 
the A-Theorist affirms claim (i) above, the endless series of events that he 
is talking about is the actual series of events that have occurred. But as 
Morriston makes clear, he is talking instead about a series which, on the 
A-theory, in no sense exists, namely, the series of events that have not yet 
happened. So Morriston says, “As I have envisaged it, the series of future 
praises is not ‘growing’ at all. As each praise becomes present, it is removed 
from the ‘collection’ of those that are yet to come. The collection of future 
3The difference between the potentiality of the future and the actuality of the past emerg-
es with special clarity in the kalam arguments for the beginning of the universe based on the 
impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. For example, al-Ghazali 
invites us to suppose that Jupiter and Saturn orbit the sun in such a way that for every one 
orbit that Saturn completes Jupiter completes two. The longer they orbit, the further Saturn 
falls behind. If they continue to orbit forever, they will approach a limit at which Saturn is 
infinitely far behind Jupiter. Of course, they will never actually arrive at this limit. But now 
turn the story around: suppose Jupiter and Saturn have been orbiting the sun from eternity 
past. Which will have completed the most orbits? The answer is that the number of their or-
bits is exactly the same, viz., infinity! That may seem absurd, but it seems to be the inevitable 
result of the actuality of the past as opposed to the potentiality of the future. 
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praises is, so to speak, losing members.” This will strike an A-Theorist as a 
bizarre ontology, one to which at least the A-theorist is by no means com-
mitted. There is no such series as Morriston imagines, any more than there 
is a series of events which were prevented, which is constantly increasing 
as time goes on. Morriston has not shown that claim (i) is false with re-
spect to the series which the A-Theorist has in mind, for the referent of the 
phrases “an endless series of events” and “an endless future” in claims (i) 
and (ii) is a different series than the series Morriston is envisaging.
Morriston denies that he is talking ontology. He says that he could re-
phrase his claim to be that the collection of future tensed truths about the 
angels’ praises is losing members. But then he is talking ontology, for such 
a rephrasing seems to presuppose that truths are abstract objects, which 
has not been justified. Morriston needs to find something that is part of re-
ality which is actually infinite in quantity in order to make an analogy with 
a beginningless series of past events. Morriston later returns to his sugges-
tion that rather than future events, which on an A-Theory of time are not 
part of reality, we consider future-tensed truths or corresponding tensed 
facts. But this move makes two unjustified assumptions: first, Platonism 
with respect to propositions and, second, the actual infinitude of proposi-
tions or facts. If we accept these assumptions, there is no need for appeal to 
future-tensed truths in order to designate an actual infinitude of proposi-
tions, since for every proposition p there is the further proposition that Tp, 
or that it is true that p. The finitist will therefore either deny Platonism with 
respect to propositions, taking them to be useful fictions perhaps, or deny 
that there are an infinite number of propositions, since, God’s knowledge 
being non-propositional, propositions are the byproduct of human intel-
lection and so merely potentially infinite in number, as we come to express 
propositionally what God knows in a non-propositional way.
Morriston reiterates his intuition that the number of angelic praises that 
will be said in an endless series is actually infinite. But the only praises 
that are actual are the ones that are said, and they will always be finite in 
number. An actually infinite number of praises will not be said. Consider 
the more familiar examples of the potential infinite in spatial division and 
addition. There is an enormous difference between taking a spatial line to 
be a densely ordered composition of points and taking it not to be com-
posed of points but potentially infinitely divisible. On the latter view one 
can continue to divide a line endlessly, but one will not make an actually 
infinite number of divisions. These are entirely distinct views of the nature 
of space, and the one cannot be collapsed into the other. Or again, if the 
universe is finite (due to space’s having a positive curvature) but endlessly 
expanding, the volume of the universe is potentially infinite, but it will not 
become actually infinite. There is a world of difference between models 
of the universe in which space is actually infinite in extent and models in 
which space is ever-expanding but always finite.
Similarly in Morriston’s illustrations what is real or actual is always 
finite. So in answer to Morriston’s question, “How many praises will be 
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said?” we should answer, “Potentially infinitely many,” and distinguish 
this from the question, “What is the number of praises in the series of fu-
ture praises?” the answer to which is “None.”
Morriston insists that on an A-Theory of time, past events likewise do 
not exist, so the non-existence of future events does not make any real 
difference. But despite confessing some puzzlement about the concept of 
the potential infinite as a limit,4 Morriston seems prepared to concede that 
the series of events that have happened is merely potentially infinite in 
the later than direction. Moreover, it is clear that nothing parallel can be 
truthfully said of the series of events that have happened in the earlier 
than direction. The number of events that have happened earlier than any 
given event can therefore only be either finite or actually infinite. On an 
A-Theory of time the temporal series of events comprises everything that 
has happened and nothing more. Note well the use of the perfect tense in 
this characterization. The perfect tense of “has happened” covers every 
time up through the present and so includes every event past and present. 
4Limits play an essential role in the mathematical process of differentiation, one of the 
pillars of the calculus. The limit of a certain function f(x) is the value of that function as x ap-
proaches a given number. This is written:
lim f(x) = L 
x→a
which is read, “As x approaches a, the limit of f(x) is L.” Sometimes one is interested in finding the 
limit of a function as the value of a increases indefinitely, in which case one substitutes the sign of the 
potential infinite “∞” for a:
lim f(x) = L 
x→∞
In such cases we are said to be determining the limit “at” infinity. Sometimes the value of a 
function increases indefinitely as the inputs approach a certain number, in which case the 
limit of the function is infinity:
lim f(x) = ∞ 
x→a
In neither case is the infinite a number, as ℵ0 is. In Morriston’s illustrations both the value of a and 
the limit of the function f(x) are ∞. So, e.g., if for every one praise uttered by one angel there are two 
uttered by the other,
lim f(x) = 2x = ∞ 
x→∞
As x approaches infinity, so does the output of the function 2x. Significantly, the function value f(a) is 
completely unrelated to the value or even the existence of a limit as x approaches a, i.e., “at” a. Thus, 
in Morriston’s illustration we are not talking about the value f(∞). Infinity is merely approached, not 
attained. So if we compare the number of praises offered by the angels, we find that they increasingly 
diverge:
lim g(x) = 2x – x = ∞ 
x→∞
But now contrast the case of two angels praising God at a 2:1 ratio from eternity past. In this case, 
as in the case of Saturn and Jupiter in al-Ghazali’s illustration mentioned in note 3, infinity has been 
attained; an actually infinite number of praises has been sung. In this case we are, indeed, concerned 
with the value f(a), and it can only be 2⋅ℵ0  =  ℵ0. 
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Everything that has happened has been actualized. As the medievals put 
it, these events have exited from their causes and are therefore no longer 
in potentiality. The actual world thus includes both what does exist and 
what did exist. But events which have yet to take place, being pure poten-
tialities, are, on a tensed view of time, not part of the actual world.5
The ontological distinction between the past-present on the one hand 
and the future on the other is especially perspicuous in “growing block” 
views of time, such as that enunciated by the middle C. D. Broad and de-
fended by Morriston’s colleague Michael Tooley. A proponent of the kalam 
argument who accepts the growing block view has no difficulty in dif-
ferentiating the actuality of the past from the potentiality of the future. 
My claim is that the tenseless existence of the past block of events is not a 
necessary condition of the past’s actuality. Even if past events do not exist, 
they are still part of the actual world in a way that future events are not, 
since the actual world comprises everything that has happened.
IV
In conclusion, it seems clear that Morriston has not succeeded in the cen-
tral purpose of his paper, namely, to show that even if an endless series 
of events is merely potentially infinite, that fact establishes no relevant 
distinction between the beginningless past and an endless future. He was 
instead forced to shift to arguing that an endless series of events cannot be 
taken to be potentially infinite. But his argument seriously misconstrued 
the A-Theory of time, substituting an imaginary series of events for the 
ongoing series of events that have actually happened.
Talbot School of Theology
5The lesson of McTaggart’s Paradox is that, if we take tense seriously, there can be no 
maximal description of reality such as is imagined in possible worlds semantics, which pro-
vide purely tenseless descriptions of the way the world might be. For an attempt to introduce 
tense into possible worlds semantics, see William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time: A 
Critical Examination, Synthese Library 293 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 
pp. 208–210.
